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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

RUTH

~IARIE

BASINGER
Plaintiff and A ppelldJnt,

vs.
STANDARD FURNITURE CO~f
PANY, a corporation; ZION'S
COOPERATIVE MERCANTILE
INSTITUTION,
Defendants and Respondents,

Case No.

7418

ZION'S SAVINGS BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY, and LOIS
GREENWOOD doing business as
LOIS GREENWOOD,
Defendants . ._,1

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

This action was brought by plaintiff against all of
the above named defendants. The action is one for
damages for personal injuries received by plaintiff when
she stumbled and fell while walking west on the sidewalk
on the south side of South Temple Street, about 22 East,
at a point where a driveway crosses the sidewalk and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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runs into the rear of the Zions Savings Bank & Trust
Company's building. The West edge of this driveway was
lower than the sidewalk to the west at the point where
plaintiff fell.
As the basis for the charge of negligence on the part
of the defendants, plaintiff alleges (see Amended Complaint, paragraph II and IV, R.p. 18) first that defendants constructed and maintained said driveway, second
used it as a means of egress and ingress to the rear entrances of their business establishments; and third that
as a result of the use thereof by heavy trucks ·and other
vehicles hauling various articles to and for defendants
the driveway was caused to sink below the level of the
sidewalk to. the west of the driveway, and, as a result
of such sinking, there was a perpendicular ledge about 3
inches high along the west edge of the driveway, which
created a dangerous nuisance to pedestrians using the
sidewalk. That plaintiff caught her foot on said raise
and fell, thereby sustaining injuries.
At the trial, and after plaintiff had rested, plaintiff's
counsel moved the court to dismiss the action with prejudice as to defendant Lois Greenwood. This motion
was granted ( R. p. 221). The other defendants made separate motions for nonsuit. The grounds stated in these motions were substantially as follows:
1. The evidence failed to show that the defendant
had committed any unlawful act or was guilty of any
negligence of any kind.
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2. There is no evidence to show that the driving of
the trucks of the defendant, or anyone else, or the use
made of the driveway by defendant, caused the defect
in the sidewalk; there is no evidence to show whether
the sidewalk went up west of the driveway or the driveway went down, the evidence showing only a difference
in elevation.
3. There is no evidence that the defect in the sidewalk did not exist before the defendant began using the
driveway.
4. There is no evidence of ownership of the driveway by the defendant or any right to the use thereof
by defendant.
As to the defendant Zion's Savings Bank the further
ground was stated that there was no evidence of any use
of the driveway by or for the said bank.
Each motion was granted and the action dismissed
as to all defendants. Plaintiff's notice of appeal filed
herein shows that the appeal is taken from the judgment
of dismissal as to all defendants, except Lois Greenwood.
In her brief, however, plaintiff states (p. 3) that she is
not appealing from the judgment of dismissal in favor
of the Zion's Savings Bank, and confines her appeal to
the dismissal as to defendants Standard Furniture Comany and Z. C. M. I. We take it, therefore, that the appeal
is abandoned by plaintiff as to the defendant Zion's
Savings Bank, and so this brief is confined to, and is
filed by, Standard Furniture Company and Z. C. M. I.
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only. Whenever the word ''defendants'' is used hereafter in this brief it will be deemed to refer only to the
Standard Furniture Company and the Z. C. M. I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
That the sidewalk to the west as it adjoined the
driveway at the point where pJaintiff fell was about
1~ inches higher than the driveway is not in dispute.
We further admit that trucks 'of various sizes up to
1~ ton capacity have used the driveway for many years
to haul merchandise to and from the rear entrances
of the -defendants' places of business. What we do dispute is that there is any evidence showing that the use
of the driveway by the defendants, or either of them,
caused this difference in elevation. We confidently assert
that the evidence not only fails to show that the use of
the driveway by trucks and vehicles caused the driveway
to sink, but affirmatively shows that the difference
in elevation between the driveway and the sidewalk to
the west was created by· constructing the sidewalk higher
than the driveway. So that there will he no chance for
a mistaken conclusion we quote the testimony of plaintiff's·own witness, James M. Armstrong, the only witness
who testified on this point:
Mr. Armstrong started to work for the Standard Furniture Company as a steady employee
October 1, 1928 (R. 215). He had worked for the
company before that as a boy (R. 210). The following is his testimony beginning on page 210
of the Record and continuing to page 212.
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Q. Do you recall that some years back the sidewalk from the driveway west was rebuilt~
A.

Yes, I recall that.

Q. And the sidewalk from the driveway, including the driYeway and east wasn't rebuilt at
that time~
A.

There has nothing been done to that driveway east, to my knowledge, since I have been
there, but I do recall this west part.

Q.

Now do you recall and did you observe that
when the sidewalk was built west from the
driveway that it was built a little higher
than the driveway~

A.

Yes, I recall that very markedly. There
isn't a great deal of a raise there but there
is a raise and it has always been there.

Q.

Since the sidewalk was built on the west side
of the driveway~

A.

Yes.

Q. And you observed that from going in and
out there all these years~
A. Yes, sir. It is approximately an inch up and
has been as long as I can remember.
Q. And did you observe on the east side of the
driveway, where the sidewalk wasn't changed
it is the same elevation~
A. Yes, sir. I would say it is the same elevation.
There is nothing there that has been changed
at all. It appears comparatively flat. When
you figure the years it has been in service
there, from weather cracks and so on. But
this part over here east of where . . . .
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Q.

East of the driveway 1

A.

East of the driveway is shattered really
worse than the driveway itself.

Q.

How many years has it been shattered that
way, that you can recall.

A.

I don't remember when it wasn't shattered.

Q.

And that would be how many years?

A.

Twenty years ago.

On re-direct examination Mr. Armstrong testified
as follows:
Q.

Mr. Armstrong, how old were you-or I will
ask you first if this cement work to the east
(west) of the driveway was done before
you became a steady employee of Standard
Furniture?

A.

It was done after I was steadily employed
there.

Q. Within the last twenty years, is that right?
A.

I would say so. I will give you the exact
date when I started there-October 1st of
1928. That makes twenty years, doesn't it?

Q. In October. Now Mr. Armstrong, I show you
what has been marked plaintiff's Exhibit
B, and I will ask you if you know when the
crack in the foreground of that picture which
runs east and west, appeared in that driveway?
A.

This large crack'
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Q. Yes.
A. 'Ve have been familiar with that particular
crack and this one over here as long as I
can remember.

Q. And you don't know when that appeared
there¥
A.

It has been there as long as I can remember.

The witness was then shown Exhibit A, marked
on the reverse side, and was asked if the driveway and
the sidewalk to the west were not on a level at the corner
of the Lois Greenwood store. The witness then indicated
that from the point marked "Y" on the exhibit northward the sidewalk and the driveway were not on the same
level. He then testified that two or three years ago
tar surfacing was placed on the driveway. Counsel then
tried to get the witness to say that Exhibit "B" shows
a dip in the driveway at the point "X," but the witness
said he could not say as he could not recall what the
driveway looked like before it was resurfaced. The foregoing is contained in the transcript pages 216-218. This
resurfacing was not done 'by the Standard Furniture
Company, but presumably by the city (R. p. 219).
The witness testified that the work of rebuilding
the sidewalk to the west of the driveway was done in
1930 or 1931. The whole thing was torn up for quite
some time and he presumed it was new all the way
through ( R. p. 220).
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ARGUMENT
THE DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO A NONSUIT
AND DISMISSAL AS THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRODUCE ANY EVIDENCE WHAT·SOEVER TO SUSTAIN HER
CHARGE OF NEGLIGENCE ALLEGED IN HER AMENDED
COMPLAINT.

I.
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE THAT DEFENDANTS
CONSTRUCTED OR MAINTAINED SAID DRIVEWAY.

There is absolutely no evidence to show that these
defendants, or any one else, constructed and maintained
this driveway. The only maintenance shown in the
record was the re-surfacing of the entrance to the driveway from the st:reet, done, presumably, by the city.
(R. p. 219). Furthermore, there is no evidence at all as
to the ownership of the alleyway. The plat, introduced
in evidence as Exhibit '' E,'' shows the property of the
Zions Savings Bank, 45 feet by 165 feet, an'd shows an
arrow extending into this alleyway or right of way. But
Willard R. Smith, the vice president of the bank, testifying on behalf of the plaintiff, stated very definitely that
the bank did not own this alleyway-all it owned was a
piece 45 feet wide on Main Street and 165 feet long on
South Temple Street (R. p. 196). The only connection
which the evidence shows these defendants have with this
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alleyway is that defendant

~tandard ~,urniture

Company

leases premises, and the defendant Z. C. M. I. owns
pren1ises, which abut at some point on this alleyway and
that they use, and have used, this alleyway to deliver
goods to and take away goods from their places of business. "\Ve. have either quoted or referred to all the
evidence which in any manner relates to the construction and maintenance and ownership of this alleyway
and respectfully submit that there is no evidence whatever to sustain the plaintiff's allegation that these defendants constructed and maintained the same.

II.
USE OF THE ALLEYWAY BY THESE DEFENDAN'l'S
IS ADMITTED.

That these defendants have used this alleyway, and
were using it at the time of plaintiff's accident, as a
means of ingress and egress to and from their respective
places of business is shown by the evidence. But there
is an absolute vacuum in the evidence as to the legal
basis upon which such use is founded, whether under
legal right or adverse use. We mention this phase simply to make it clear that there is, under the evidence, no
duty on the part of either defendant to keep the alleyway
and driveway in repair because of or as an incident
to ownership thereof, or any claim of ownership.
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III.
PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT OF ACTION, IF SHE HAS ONE,
MUST REST ENTIRELY ON THE ALLEGATION THAT THE
USE MADE BY THESE DEFENDANTS OF SAID DRIVEWAY AND ALLEYWAY IN RUNNING TRUCKS AND OTHER
VEHICLES OVER THE SAME CAUSED THE DRIVEWAY TO SINK BELOW THE LEVEL OF THE SIDEWALK
TO THE WEST, LEAVING A PERPENDICULAR LEDGE
ABOUT 3 INCHES HIGH ALONG THE WEST EDGE OF
THE DRIVEWAY.

We remind the .court again that we have quoted and
referred to all the evidence in the record that could have
any bearing upon this point. We shall proceed to analyze
it.
There is absolutely no evidence that at some time in
the past said driveway was on a level with the sidewalk
to the west. There is definite evidence that it is now,
and for 20 years has been on a level with the sidewalk
to the east. See statement of Mr. Armstrong R. 212,
quoted in our Statement of Facts and see photo Exhibit
1. Unless it is shown that at some time prior to plaintiff's
accident the driveway was on a level with the sidewalk
to the west how can it be said that at some time prior
to plaintiff's accident it sunk below the sidewalk leveU
It might be assumed, of course, that the driveway, as
originally constructed, was level with the west sidewalk
as then constructed, the same as it is on the east side.
If the evidence were that there had been no change in
the sidewalk to the west and that it is still the original
sidewalk and that it originally was on a level with the
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drive,Yay there might be room for an inference that the
driveway had settled or sunk, providing, of course, there
was no room for an inference that the sidewalk had
raised by reason of the action of the elements.
There would also be the difficulty of finding anything in the evidence to show that the trucks or vehicles
used by o,r for either or both of these defendants caused
this sinking. There is not a shred of evidence to show
that. All that appears is this: There is a difference in
elevation between the west edge of the driveway and the
adjacent sidewalk of about llh inches at the point where
plaintiff claims she fell, the lowest point along the entire
west edge. So we must conclude or permit the jury to infer
that it was the trucks of the defendants that caused
that difference in elevation. There is no evidence that
this driveway was not used by others than these two defendants. There is no evidence to show that the settlement might not have occured from natural causes. The
photos, exhibits A, B and 1, show the west part of the
driveway to be entirely intact, except for the crack
running east and west shown on exhibit B, and there appears to be no difference in elevation between the two
sides of this crack. The whole driveway must have
settled, and such settlement is as readily attributable to
the weather conditions or to the manner of the original
construction as it is to the use by defendants' trucks.
Again, how can either defendant be held liable without proof that it was its trucks that caused the sinking1
Suppose it was the trucks of just one of the defendants
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that caused the sinking. Could the other defendant then
be held liable~ Are we to assume that the trucks of
both defendants caused the sinking~ If there was a
sinking it could have been caused by the weight of one
extra heavy truck going over the driveway once. That
truck could have belonged to or have been servicing
either of the defendants, or it could have belonged to
or have been servicing neither of them. It is apparent
that to charge both, or either of the defendants with
having caused the sinking through use by their or its
trucks is to indulge, not in any legitimate inference, but
in pure spe,culation. If the driveway sank after its construction, why didn't it sink on the east side as well as
on the west side~ The testimony above quoted, and
exhibit 1, show that it is on a level with the sidewalk to
the east everi though that sidewalk was ''shattered really
worse than the driveway and has been shattered for 20
years." (R. p. 212). What caused the shattering of the
sidewalk to the east¥ That cannot be credited to the
use of the driveway by trucks. It is entirely possible
that the cracks in the driveway also occurred from causes
other than passage of trucks over the driveway.
Fortunately we are not left to speculation, nor is
there any basis even for indulging in inferences, as to
how this difference in elevation between the west edge
of the driveway and the adjacent sidewalk occurred.
It was built tha,t way when the sidewalk to the west was
rebuilt in 1930 or 1931. This is the definite, positive
testimony of plaintiff's own witness, James M. Armstrong, from his own personal knowledge of the fact.
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He testified that the sidewalk to the west of the driveway
was reconstructed in 1930 or 1931 (R. p. 220). He further testified as follows:

Q. Xow do you recall and did you observe that
when the sidewalk was built west from the
driveway that it was built a little higher
than the driveway1
A.

Yes, I recall that very markedly. There isn't
a great deal of raise there but there is a
raise and it has always been there.''

Q. Since the sidewalk was built on the west side
of the driveway 1
A. Yes.
In view of such testimony where is there any room
for infering that the use of the driveway by trucks
caused the difference in elevation between the driveway
and the sidewalk to the west 1 The cause of the difference
in elevation is thus fully and definitely accounted for.
The walk was constructed that way, and these defendants had nothing whatsoever to do with that construction.

IV.
AN ABUTTING OWNER OR OCCUPIER IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING THE SIDEWALK IN
FRONT OF HIS PREMISES.

Section 15-7-47, U.C.A. 1943, provides as follows:
''The foregoing provisions of this Article
[relating to special assessment for street conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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struction] shall apply to the repaving of streets
and sidewalks, but not to repairs thereon. The
governing body shall, by ordinance, define what
constitutes repaving, what repairs and what extraordinary repairs. The cost of ordinary repairs
shall be born by the municipality, and the governing body may levy and collect special taxes
upon the abutting property for the purpose of
defraying the cost of repairs defined to be extraordinary without previous notice of intention, or
any right of the property owners to protest.''
Under the foregoing statute, and under the authorities generally, the abutting property owner or occupier
has no obligation or duty to keep the sidewalk in front
of his :property in repair. This is true even though the
property owner constructed the sidewalk, and it was
taken over by the city after construction. See Wright
v. Hines, 235 SW 831; Carney v. P11octor, 237 Mass. 203,
129 NE 605; Birchfield v. Diehl, 189 !SW 845.

v.
THERE IS NO LIABILITY ON THE PART OF AN
ABUTTING OWNER OR OCCUPIER UNLESS HE DOES
SOMETHING AFFIRMATIVE TO CREATE THE DEFECT.

Atkinson v. Sheriff Motor Co., 203 Iowa 195, 212
NW 484.
The defendant maintained a sales office and service
station. A driveway crossed the sidewalk to a side entrance and was used by automobiles and trucks. Such
use caused a depression in the sidewalk 6 to 12 inches
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wide, 2 feet long and llf2 inches deep. Plaintiff stepped
one foot in this depression and fell and was injured. The
verdict was directed for defendant. The court held the
duty to repair rests with the city, saying:
•'It is a general rule, almost universally recognized, that an owner or tenant in the occupancy of a building abutting upon a public sidewalk or street, who, by some affirmative act or
perhaps by some act of negligence constituting a
nuisance, is liable to persons injured in com~e
quence thereof. (citing cases.)

"It is either conceded or clearly shown by the
evidence that the depression in the sidewalk of
which plaintiff complained was several years in
forming, and that it resulted from the passage
of automobiles and trucks from and to the street
over the same. It did not result from the affirmative act of the servants or agents of defendant,
nor was it the result of negligence on its part.
"Appellee (defendant) did nothing affirmatively to cause the depression in the walk, which
was attributable soley to the use made thereof,
which was lawful."

Adams v. Crapotte, 69 SW 2nd 460. Tex.
Defendant leased a garage facing St. Mary's Street.
There was an abrasion in the sidewalk at the place where
customers and others drove into and out of defendant's
place of business. The evidence showed that the use of
the driveway by cars going in and out made the hole
deeper after defendant's occupancy. Plaintiff fell by
stepping into the hole. The jury found defendant negliSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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gent in causing this condition to exist, in permitting it
to exist and in failing to repair the hole. The plaintiff
theory was that defendant was enjoying some kind of
special privilege in the sidewalk by using the same as
an integral part of his business, for which reason the
duty devolved upon him, as the proprietor of the business, to keep the sidewalk in repair.
"It would scarcely seem necessary to cite
authorities in support of the proposition that
sidewalks are a part of the street, that the duty
to exercise ordinary care to maintain them in a
reasonably safe condition for the use of the public
rests upon the city, and that the abutting owner
owes no duty in that regard.

''Plaintiff seeks to hold the tenant liable
on the ground that he contributed to this condition by inviting his customers to use the drive in
way over the sidewalk Her theory is based
essentially upon the assumption that appellant
was making a wrongful use of a portion of the
public thoroughfare. Is the assumption correct 1
We think not. Access to a public highway is an
incident to the ownership of land abutting theron,
and the right of such access is private property
passing to the lessee. That right cannot be taken
for public purposes or destroyed without adequate compensation being made therefor. 26 SW
250; 36 L.R.A. (NS) 662; Ann. Cas. 1913 E 870;
153 NE 325; 47 A.L.R. 897; 13 RCL p. 142, Sec.
126; 44 C.J. Sec. 3711, p. 943." The court quotes
from Shudder v. Schroth, 146 Cal. 437, 80 p. 624,
as follows:
'' 'The use of a sidewalk by the owner of a
lot for purposes of communication with the street
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is equally legitimate, and equally an ordinary use,
as that of passing longitudinally along it.' "
·'In its last analysis the judgment in the
instant case can be upheld alone upon the ground
that it is the duty of abutting owners, and like\\ise of their lessees, to repair the public thoroughfare adjoining their premises. That duty
does not exist, but rests exclusively on the municipality, and where there is not duty there can be
no negligence.''

Home Brewing Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 123 NE
721. (Ind.)

This city was sued for damages by a Mrs. Crawford
who fell because of a hole in the sidewalk. The hole was
in front of the Brewing Co's premises and was about six
inches west of an elevator in the sidewalk used to take
beer into and out of the company's basement. In delivering kegs the company would allow them to roll down
from the wagon onto a mat and then roll over to the
elevator. The effect of the deliveries and uses of the sidewalk was to create the hole which was 2 feet long, 1:%
feet wide and 3 inches deep. The city paid the judgment
and sued the company to recover the amount it was
forced to pay. The court denied judgment saying:
''In order that the city may recover it must
appear that the unsafe condition of the sidewalk
has been brought about by the wrongful act or
omission of such alleged injuring party; and such
alleged injuring party will not be estopped from
showing that he was under no obligation to keep
the street in a safe condition, and that it was not
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through his fault that the accident occurred.
There is no charge in the complaint that the appellant had made any wrongful use of the sidewalk.
It was engaged in a business that at the time was
lawful, and it had a right under the law to deliver to its customers its merchandise over and
upon the sidewalks of the city. There is no violent
or improper act charged. The use of the sidewalk for the purpose of delivering its merchandise was in common with a similar use of the sidewalk made by a number of other persons. The
defect was not a result of any affirmative wrongful act on the part of appellant, but was the
result of the continuous use thereof for 4 years, or
more, by appellant and others, including the general :public walking over such sidewalk, which continuous use for 4 years resulted in the defect complained of. All of these uses made of the sidewalk
were proper and legitimate and such uses produced the gradual wear which resulted in the
defect complained of.
''The duty of repairing streets and sidewalks
is upon the city, and not upon the abutting owners, or upon the persons using such streets or
sidewalks in a legitmate way and such abutting
property owners and such persons so using the
street are not liable to a person injured by such
uses, unless such uses were wrongful and unlawful.''

Volke v. Otway, 181 A. 156.
Plaintiff sued the owner and tenant of premises
abutting a sidewalk for injuries received when she caught
her foot in a depression in the sidewalk near an iron
door covering the stairway to the celler of the building.
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The plaintiff's theory was that trucks backed up onto
the sidewalk, merchandise in heavy parcels were thrown
upon the sidewalk next to this iron door and such use
caused the depression. There was no testimony as to how
long the depression had existed, though it was observed
as early as 1918 by one witness. The tenant entered upon
the premises in 1934. There was no proof as to what created the depression. The court affirmed a judgment
of nonsuit, saying:
''The trial court when passing on the motion
to nonsuit was bound to accept as an undisputed
fact, with no proof as to its cause, that the depression in the sidewalk which caused the plaintiff's injuries, existed in 1918. The mere happening of an accident, and the fact that a sidewalk
has been in a defective and dilapidated condition
for several years, to an extent that it constitutes
a nuisance, does not in itself render an abutting
owner liable to the injured party. The burden is
on the plaintiff to show that the owner or his
predecessor in title participated in the creation
of the nuisance. It is entirely settled in this state
that the owner owes no duty to maintain the sidewalk in front of his premises, and is not responsible for any defects therein which are not caused
by his own wrongful act.''
There was nothing unlawful, or even extraordinary,
in the use of the driveway across the sidewalk under the
evidence in this case. The Z.C.M.I. used it to receive
merchandise for its tea room and to take out the garbage
resulting therefrom. The Standard Furniture Co. used
it to take furniture in and out. The law is well settled
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that an abutting owner or occupant has a right of access
from the street to his property. The rule is stated in
25 Am. Jur. p. 448, Sec. 154, Highways, as follows:
"The right of access to and from a public
highway is one of the incidents of the ownership
or occupancy of land abutting thereon. Such right
is appurtenant to the land and exists when the
fee title to the way is in the public as well as
when it is in private ownership. It is a property
right of which the owner cannot be deprived
without just compensation.''
To the same effect is 44 C.J. p. 943, Sec. 3711, applying the rule specifically to city streets, citing Davis v.
Midvale City, 56 Utah, 1, 189 P. 74, and Hague v. Juab
County M~lls, et c., Co., 37 Utah 290, 107 P. 249.
1

Den Br,aven v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co.,
115 N. J. L. 543, 181 A. 46. Here the court, sustaining!
a demurrer to plaintiff's complaint said:
''It is not alleged that the use of the sidewalk was in improper one, in that vehicles were
not proper to be so used or that the crossing
itself was not a lawful one and suitable for the
purpose. The use, therefore, by the company was
that use which every occupant of premises with
a driveway therefrom crossing the sidewalk into
the public highway exercises, each differing in
degree, perhaps. It was the same lawful use,
though different in kind, that the pedestrian exercises when he travels the sidewalk longitudinally
or in crossing.
"In the present day of the prevalence of the
automobile it is perhaps the exceptional dwelling
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or business place that does not have for the use
of its owner or occupant a crossing from the
vehicle portion of the highway into its premises
crossing the sidewalk, usually over paving built
specially for the purpose. Such construction and
use, however, are recognized as normal and lawful ones. If the law were as contended for by
the appellant, it would follow that an owner of
property could not so construct or use the sidewalk, usually the only means of access, without
incurring an obligation to correct the slippery
condition to which his vehicles had contributed,
and incurring liability to any one who happened
to slip thereon."
VI.
THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY PLAINTIFF ARE NOT
IN POINT UNDER THE FACTS OF THE INSTANT CASE.

Bearing in mind that in the case at ~bar there is in
the record no evidence at all that these defendants, or
either of them, constructed or maintained the driveway in
question, and there is not only no evidence that the
use made of the driveway by either defendant caused
it to sink, or that there has ever been any sinking, but
the evidence affirmatively shows that the sidewalk to
the west was rebuilt in 1930 or 1931 and was then rebuilt
higher than the driveway, we shall show that plaintiff's
authorities have no application to this case.

Salt Lake City v. Schubach, 108 Utah 266, 159 P.
2nd 149. In this case the abutting owner and occupant
were using for their own business purposes a well in
the sidewalk with iron doors to receive goods into the
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basement. This was an extraordinary use of the sidewalk and involved a structure placed in the sidewalk
hy the owner, which strueture was not kept in proper
repair. There was no right in the first place to install
and maintain the structure. But, as already shown, an
abutting owner or occupant has the legal right to drive
into and out of his property over the sidewalk.
Gra.nucd v. CZaasern, 204 Cal. 509, 269 P. 437, 59

ALR 435. This case likewise involved the placing of a
structure over the sidewalk that was for the sole benefit
of the abutting owner or occupant, a wooden structure
superimposed upon the sidewalk used for a driveway.
This case is referred to and distinguished upon its
special facts in the case of DaT!y v. Mathew·s. (Cal. App.)
122 P. 2nd 81, where the court says :
"Under the common law there is no liability
upon the part of an adjacent landowner for injuries occurring on a public sidewalk. Likewise in
this state there is no obligation of the abutting
landowner to keep the sidewalk in front of his
premises in repair or in a safe condition for
public travel, in the absence of statute or ordinance imposing such a duty upon him. Where a
portion of a sidewalk is used for the particular
benefit of the adjacent landowner, such as grates,
or glass therein for light, or sidewalk elevators
or heavy planked driveways, it has been held that
the abutting landowner is liable for negligent
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construction or maintenance which proximately ·
causes personal injury to a pedestrian. No case,
howeyer, has gone so far as to charge an abutting
landowner with liability for the condition of a
driveway, whether used by him or not, unless he
personally created, th.rough use or otherwise,
some unsafe condition therein.
''The case of Granucci v. Claasen, 204 Cal.
509, 269 P. 437, 59 ALR 435 . . . . is not contra to
what we have said. In that case the abutting
property owner had constructed, with the permission of the city, a special type of driveway for
her exclusive benefit; and so it was held that she
was directly liable to a pedestrian for an injury
caused by her failure to keep the driveway in
repair. The case is an exception to the rule and
its doctrine does not cover the case before us nor
should it be extended to it."
The case of M onsch v. Pellister, 187 Cal. 790, 204 P.
224, involved a skylight structure in the sidewalk and so
has no application to the present case.
The cases of Davis v. T,allon, 96 N JL 618, 103 A. 236,
and Zak v. Craig, 5 NJ Misc. 275, 136 A. 410, are referred
to and explained in Volke v. Otway (NJL), 181 A. 156,
hereinbefore cited and quoted as follows:
''Both decisions held that there was sufficient
proof from which the jury might infer that the
landlord leased the land and sidewalk for a use
not consistent with the purpose for which it was
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constructed, which is not the fact in the case now
under consideration.''
It appears in both cases that a regularly constructed
driveway was not involved, but the use was over the
sidewalk as such and that the unauthorized use over it
by heavy vehicles broke the sidewalk and made it dangerous to pedestrians. In the Davis case the court says:
''The jury might infer from the evidence
that the appellants leased the land and sidewalk
for a use not consistent with the purpose for
which the walk was constructed ... and that
such use might, and probably would, create a
nuisance by obstructing the safe use thereof by
pedestrians.''
In the Zak case the court says :
''There was plenary proof that the sidewalk
did not become defective and unsafe from the
ordinary use thereof by the general public, but
it became broken up as a result of a use for
which it was not normally designed, namely, the
passage of heavy motor trucks over it to and from
plaintiff's garage, and in which the flagstones
were broken and a hole 7 inches in diameter and
6 inches in depth was made in the sidewalk.''
Without further comment, we submit it is patent
that these cases can be of no assistance in deciding the
instant case.
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JiuUin.s v. Siegal Cooper Co., 95 App. Div. 234, 88
NYS 737 aff. 183 NY 129, 75 NE 1112, likewise is not

in point. There was no constructed driveway there involved. The sidewalk was constructed of flagstones.
The stable was built out to or very near the sidewalk
line. On one side of this building there was a lane leading to the rear to another stable. ''During the summer
of 1902, some months before the accident to plaintiff, the
flagstone in front of the lane became disturbed out of
position by reason of heavily laden wagons and trucks
passing back and forth over the same on entering and
leaving said premises.'' A flagstone became loose so it
rocked when stepped on and was raised above the adjoining stone 2% to 3 inches. Here was definite proof that
the defendant, or his contractor, in going over the sidewalk with vehicles laden with rock or manure caused the
defect complained of. It is evident therefor, that the
decision in that case can have no authority in the case
at bar.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit the plaintiff produced no
evidence of any negligent act or omission on the part
of either of these defendants. There is no proof that
either defendant caused the difference in elevation between the driveway and the sidewalk to the west, over
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dence shows that this difference in elevation resulted
from a reconstruction of the sidewalk to the west. There
is no showing that either of these defendants had any
duty to correct that construction. We respectfully submit that the trial court committed no error in entering
a non suit and dismissal and that its action in so doing
should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted.
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